Executive Summary Recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East point to a structural shift in the logic of air warfare. Technologically advanced air forces are increasingly confronted by adversaries capable of generating sustained aerial pressure through the large-scale use of relatively inexpensive drones, missiles, and loitering munitions. These actors are able to maintain continuous operational tempo, replenish losses rapidly, and adapt in near real time. As a result, control of the air no longer guarantees decisive outcomes. What is emerging is a growing decisiveness gap in air power: tactical and operational superiority does not necessarily translate into strategic success when adversaries can prolong the confrontation and impose cumulative costs over time. This shift reflects the emergence of a new operational logic defined by quantity, precision, affordability, accessibility, and versatility. Together, these dynamics enable sustained attack cycles that impose economic, operational, and psychological pressure on defending states. In this environment, technological superiority remains necessary but is no longer sufficient. Strategic effectiveness increasingly depends on the ability to sustain operations over time, maintain industrial output, and preserve resilience under prolonged attack. No single state, however advanced, is structurally equipped to meet these demands alone. Existing alliance frameworks, largely designed for deterrence or short-duration conflict, are not optimized for long-duration aerial attrition. This paper argues for the creation of a Western Air Coalition of the Willing: a flexible, functional framework linking the United States and its partners across Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. By enabling the pooling of industrial capacity, the coordination of technological innovation, and the systematic exchange of operational learning, such a coalition would help restore the ability of technologically advanced powers to translate operational advantage into strategic outcomes in an era increasingly defined by endurance. Air Superiority Is Not Enough: The Case for an Air Coalition of the Willing in Long-Duration Warfare During the latest war in Afghanistan, a Taliban message directed at American forces circulated widely: “You have the watches, we have the time.” What appeared to be a simple provocation captured a fundamental feature of contemporary conflict: the growing ability of weaker actors to offset technological inferiority through endurance, adaptation, and temporal advantage. Tactical superiority does not necessarily translate into decisive outcomes when the weaker side can prolong the confrontation and steadily increase its cumulative costs. A similar dynamic is now taking shape in the air domain. Over the past four years, the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have revealed an operational environment in which technologically advanced air forces or platforms face adversaries capable of generating sustained aerial pressure. Through the large-scale use of relatively inexpensive drones, missiles, and loitering munitions, these actors are able to maintain a continuous operational tempo, replenish losses rapidly, and adapt in near real time. These developments point to a structural shift in the logic of air warfare. Adversaries that lack the technological capacity to contest air superiority directly are nevertheless able to erode its strategic value. By relying on mass, repetition, and replenishment, they impose persistent pressure that prevents the conflict from becoming decisive. What is emerging is a growing decisiveness gap in air power: control of the air no longer guarantees the ability to translate battlefield advantage into strategic outcomes. In this environment, technological superiority remains necessary but no longer sufficient. What increasingly determines outcomes is the capacity to sustain operations over time: to absorb continuous pressure, to replenish defensive and offensive systems at scale, and to maintain political and economic resilience under prolonged attack. This requirement places growing strain on national industrial bases, defense budgets, and operational readiness, particularly in conflicts defined by high intensity and extended duration. No single state, however advanced, is structurally equipped to meet these demands alone. The scale, tempo, and cost of sustained missile and drone warfare exceed the capacity of even the most capable air powers when acting in isolation. Existing alliance frameworks, largely designed for deterrence or short-duration high-intensity conflict, are not optimized for the requirements of prolonged aerial attrition. A flexible “Western Air Coalition of the Willing” would offer a necessary adaptation to this emerging reality. Here, “Western” is understood in functional rather than geographic terms, encompassing the United States and its network of allies and partners across Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. By linking air forces, policymakers, industry actors, and expert communities across national boundaries, such a framework would enable the pooling of industrial capacity, the acceleration of operational learning, the coordination of technological innovation, and the distribution of the burdens associated with sustained air campaigns. In doing so, it would help restore the ability of technologically advanced powers to convert operational advantage into strategic outcomes in an era increasingly defined by endurance rather than decisiveness. From Europe to the Middle East: The Challenge of Attritional Air Warfare As Yuval Peleg has noted, the changing character of contemporary air warfare is driven by five mutually reinforcing dynamics: quantity, precision, affordability, accessibility, and versatility. Aerial campaigns increasingly rely on large volumes of relatively inexpensive systems rather than small numbers of highly sophisticated platforms. Drones, cruise missiles, and certain classes of ballistic missiles can be launched repeatedly and at scale, generating sustained pressure on defensive systems. At the same time, precision strike is no longer the exclusive advantage of technologically advanced militaries. Advances in guidance systems, satellite navigation, and commercially available technologies have lowered the barriers to acquiring relatively accurate long-range strike capabilities, enabling even actors with limited industrial bases to field such systems. Affordability reinforces this shift. Many of these platforms are inexpensive relative to the systems required to intercept them, creating a cost asymmetry that allows attackers to sustain repeated launch cycles while imposing disproportionate costs on defenders. Accessibility further amplifies these dynamics, as drone technologies and missile components are increasingly available through globalized supply chains and dual-use ecosystems, enabling decentralized production and rapid adaptation. Finally, contemporary aerial platforms are highly versatile: drones can perform reconnaissance, strike, electronic warfare, and decoy functions within the same operational framework, complicating defensive responses and enhancing the effectiveness of low-cost systems. Taken together, these dynamics produce a new operational logic of “affordable mass” that locks technologically superior adversaries into attritional air campaigns. Attackers no longer require high penetration rates to impose strategic pressure; sustained launch cycles alone can generate economic strain, operational fatigue, and psychological pressure on defending societies. Over time, the depletion of active defense systems under high-intensity, long-duration pressure risks eroding the operational latitude necessary for states to sustain military operations. This evolution marks a broader shift in the role of air power. For much of the post-Cold War period, Western strategic thinking treated air power as an instrument capable of producing rapid and decisive outcomes. The precision-guided munitions revolution, reinforced by campaigns such as NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, appeared to confirm that technologically advanced air forces could paralyze adversaries through targeted strikes and information superiority. Contemporary conflicts increasingly challenge this assumption. In Ukraine, Russia has conducted repeated waves of missile and drone strikes against infrastructure, military targets, and urban centers since 2022, while Ukraine has developed its own long-range strike capabilities to target assets deep inside Russian territory. A similar dynamic emerged in the confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran in early 2026. Following a U.S.-Israeli air campaign against Iranian military infrastructure on February 28, Iran launched large-scale missile and drone attacks across the region. Israel and the UAE absorbed the majority of these strikes. In Israel alone, the offensive triggered more than 60,000 alert sirens to date, many in densely populated areas. In the Emirati case, drones accounted for many incoming threats. Although interception rates exceeded ninety percent in both countries, casualties, infrastructure damage, and prolonged operational strain persisted. As a result, air power no longer functions primarily as an instrument of rapid strategic decision, but as a mechanism that enables prolonged contests of endurance. This shift exposes a structural mismatch between the demands of contemporary air warfare and the way Western-oriented air powers are currently organized, equipped, and coordinated, raising the need for new forms of cooperation capable of sustaining effectiveness under conditions of long-duration aerial attrition. The Case for an Air Coalition of the Willing The return of high-intensity, long-duration air warfare carries significant implications for Western strategic planning. Sustaining defensive operations against prolonged missile and drone campaigns requires interceptor inventories, radar coverage, logistical support, and industrial production capacities that increasingly exceed the capabilities of individual states. At the same time, maintaining offensive capabilities capable of suppressing launch infrastructures demands advanced intelligence, long-range strike systems, and coordination across multiple theaters. In this environment, deeper cooperation among Western-oriented air powers becomes a strategic necessity. The United States, European air forces, Ukraine, Israel, and other aligned partners face converging challenges: defending national territory against sustained aerial attack, protecting critical infrastructure, and preserving freedom of action under continuous pressure. As Winston Churchill observed, “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” A Western Air Coalition of the Willing offers a practical response to this emerging reality. Rather than a rigid alliance, it would function as a flexible framework to coordinate operational learning, align industrial production, and accelerate technological innovation across the air and space domains. On joint operational learning, the wars in Ukraine and in the Middle East have generated extensive experience in drone warfare, missile defense, electronic warfare, and integrated air defense architectures. Ukraine has developed layered approaches to counter mass drone attacks, combining radar detection, electronic warfare, interceptor drones, and rapid tactical adaptation. Israel contributes decades of experience in defending against rockets, missiles, and drones within what is widely considered the world’s most advanced integrated defensive system. Systematic exchanges of operational lessons would accelerate adaptation across theaters. Second, coordinated industrial production. Sustained air campaigns generate continuous demand for interceptors, sensors, and counter-drone systems. A useful model is the Drone Coalition established in 2024 to support Ukraine. Rather than a formal alliance, it operates as a flexible, ad hoc mechanism that coordinates funding, procurement, and production of drones across participating states. Built on voluntary contributions and rapid decision-making, it allows partners to scale output, diversify supply, and respond quickly to battlefield demand. Third, technological innovation to mitigate cost asymmetry. The imbalance between inexpensive drones and costly interceptors has accelerated interest in alternative solutions, including interceptor drones, directed-energy systems, AI-enabled detection, and advanced electronic warfare capabilities. These technologies offer the potential to reduce interception costs while expanding defensive capacity. To be effective, such a coalition would likely need to remain flexible and functionally organized rather than institutionalized. It could rely on complementary strengths among participating partners, combining U.S. technological depth and space-based capabilities with Israeli and Ukrainian operational experience, and European industrial capacity. Cooperation would most likely take place through ad hoc, mission-oriented arrangements rather than permanent structures, enabling rapid adaptation while preserving national autonomy. Cooperation must also extend beyond defense. Sustaining strategic effectiveness requires coordinated offensive capabilities to identify, target, and suppress launch infrastructures before sustained attack cycles are generated. Long-range strike systems, space-enabled targeting, and integrated intelligence-sharing architectures will be essential. Participating partners bring complementary strengths. The United States provides technological depth, space-based early warning, and industrial scale. Israel and Ukraine contribute extensive operational experience within combat-tested defensive architectures. Europe offers advanced aerospace industries, research capacity, and significant manufacturing potential. Conclusion: Sustaining Air Power in an Era of Affordable Mass The diffusion of inexpensive aerial strike technologies has altered the balance between offense and defense in the air domain. Quantity, affordability, and accessibility now allow adversaries to impose sustained pressure on technologically superior states without achieving air superiority. In this environment, technological superiority alone no longer guarantees strategic advantage. Any collective response must also recognize clear constraints: it is neither feasible nor desirable to dilute or transfer core technological advantages. The objective is not to build new formal alliances, but to develop flexible, ad hoc partnerships focused on specific operational challenges. Such arrangements allow states to cooperate without compromising sensitive capabilities, while still addressing the structural demands of sustained air warfare. This is particularly important in confronting adversaries such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, which have demonstrated a persistent capacity for rapid adaptation and diffusion of military innovation. Effectiveness therefore depends increasingly on the ability to adapt, sustain operations, and absorb prolonged pressure, capabilities that are difficult to generate at the national level alone. At the same time, important constraints must be acknowledged. Differences in threat perception, limits on technology sharing, and concerns about escalation, particularly vis-à-vis Iran, Russia, or China, are likely to shape the scope and depth of such cooperation. A flexible coalition model helps mitigate these challenges by allowing states to cooperate where interests converge without requiring full strategic alignment. A Western Air Coalition of the Willing would provide a platform to align operational experience, industrial capacity, and technological innovation across allied air forces. By coordinating these efforts, Western-oriented air powers can strengthen defensive resilience while preserving offensive freedom of action. In an era defined by high-intensity, long-duration air warfare, strategic advantage will belong not only to those who achieve air superiority, but to those who can organize, adapt, and endure collectively.