Executive Summary Nigeria stands at a critical juncture. Its demographic weight, economic potential, and regional influence make it a central pillar of Africa’s future, yet the country is facing its most serious internal upheaval since the civil war of the late 1960s. A multidimensional conflict now blends jihadist insurgency, organized criminality, climate-driven communal violence, and renewed separatist agitation. Millions are displaced, state authority is under sustained pressure, and instability is spreading across West Africa. This convergence of security crises has strategic implications well beyond Nigeria’s borders. Europe faces rising migration pressures, energy vulnerabilities, and setbacks to its governance and development agenda in the region. Israel confronts the expansion of jihadist networks, the erosion of long-standing African partnerships, and challenges to its broader strategic posture on the continent. The United States, long the primary external security partner in West Africa, views Nigeria as essential to regional counterterrorism, maritime security, and its competition with China and Russia. Because the interests of Europe, Israel, and the United States largely converge in Nigeria, a coordinated transatlantic-Israeli strategy is both feasible and strategically compelling. Each actor brings distinct comparative advantages: Europe excels in governance reform and institutional capacity-building; Israel contributes operational experience, intelligence cooperation, and technological innovation; and the United States provides unmatched diplomatic leverage, military resources, and regional presence. Nigeria’s fragmentation is not inevitable. But reversing current trends requires coherent, coordinated engagement that addresses both immediate security threats and the structural drivers of conflict. No single external actor can stabilize Nigeria alone. Together, however, Europe, Israel, and the United States can help restore territorial control, strengthen state institutions, and improve the prospects for durable stability in Africa’s most populous nation. 1. Understanding Nigeria’s Multidimensional War Nigeria’s conflict cannot be understood through the prism of a single insurgency or a localized crisis. It is instead a complex national war involving several interconnected systems of violence. The jihadist insurgency in the northeast remains the most internationally recognizable dimension. Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province continue to exert influence, control rural zones, intimidate communities and undermine the authority of the Nigerian state. Their capacity to regenerate, adapt and exploit regional borders has integrated the Lake Chad Basin into the broader jihadist arc extending from the Sahel to East Africa. In the northwest, however, a different and increasingly dangerous phenomenon has developed. Rural banditry, originally associated with cattle theft and local disputes, has transformed into a network of heavily armed criminal organizations capable of mass abductions, attacks on military installations and the extortion of entire districts. Over time, tactical links between bandits and jihadist elements have grown, facilitating arms trafficking, recruitment and the movement of fighters. This convergence amplifies the threat each group poses and complicates state responses. Along Nigeria’s Middle Belt, environmental pressures have intensified farmer–herder conflicts, turning seasonal disputes into deadly cycles of revenge, ethnic polarization and displacement. Climate change, population density and land scarcity have contributed to violence that now threatens the food security and social cohesion of multiple states. Finally, in the southeast, separatist activism has entered a new phase in which political grievances have been accompanied by violent attacks, enforced shutdowns and challenges to the authority of state institutions. These four dynamics reinforce and accelerate one another. The overextension of the security forces in one region weakens state capacity elsewhere. Criminal groups exploit governance vacuums created by insurgencies, while political grievances feed into separatist narratives. Understanding this national conflict as an integrated system is essential for designing effective external engagement. 2. Foreign Interests and Great-Power Dynamics Nigeria’s stability is central to the interests of three categories of external actors: Europe, the United States and Israel and the competing great powers, China and Russia. The interaction of these actors will shape Nigeria’s trajectory and West Africa’s security environment for years to come. Europe’s Stakes For Europe, the consequences of Nigeria’s instability are immediate and tangible. Nigeria is a major point of origin and transit for West Africans attempting to reach Europe through irregular migration channels. As violence, unemployment and displacement rise, migration pressures will increase correspondingly. Furthermore, Europe has become increasingly dependent on diversified energy sources since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Nigeria is an important supplier of liquefied natural gas. Sabotage of pipelines, insecurity in the Niger Delta and disruptions to production pose direct risks to European energy planning. European engagement in governance, public-sector reform and anti-corruption efforts (areas where the EU has invested heavily) are also undermined by Nigeria’s deteriorating security conditions, which erode institutional capacity and limit the reach of state services. The United States: Strategic Priority and Primary Security Actor The United States has long regarded Nigeria as a cornerstone of West African security and an indispensable partner in counterterrorism. Washington’s interests are threefold. First, the U.S. seeks to prevent jihadist groups from developing safe havens that could threaten international aviation, maritime routes in the Gulf of Guinea or American interests across the Sahel. Nigeria’s capacity to contain Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) is therefore central to broader U.S. counterterrorism architecture. Second, the U.S. is deeply invested in maritime security, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea, which is vital for global shipping and energy flows. American naval cooperation, capacity-building programs and regional coordination efforts depend on a relatively stable Nigeria capable of leading West African maritime initiatives. Third, the United States considers Nigeria a pivotal arena for great-power competition. China’s financial influence and Russia’s growing security presence challenge the traditional American role in the region. Washington views Nigeria as a country whose alignment will shape broader African geopolitics. Supporting Nigerian stability is therefore essential not only for counterterrorism but also for maintaining U.S. geopolitical footing on the continent. Because of these strategic priorities, the United States and Israel (both focused on counterterrorism, maritime security and the containment of Iranian- and jihadist-aligned networks) share a deeply aligned strategic outlook in Nigeria. Israel’s security cooperation with Nigeria has historically complemented U.S. efforts rather than competing with them. This alignment makes trilateral cooperation not only possible but strategically advantageous. Israel’s Interests Israel’s engagement in Nigeria is rooted in long-standing security partnerships. Israeli firms and agencies have provided counter-terrorism training, intelligence cooperation, cyber-defense tools and border-monitoring technologies. Nigeria’s stability is critical to preventing jihadist corridors from linking the Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea, which would threaten Israel’s diplomatic and security relationships across Africa. Moreover, Nigerian stability influences African voting patterns at multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, where Israel seeks to broaden its support. China and Russia China and Russia remain the principal challengers to Western leadership in Nigeria. China’s dominance in infrastructure financing gives it extensive economic leverage, while Russia seeks to expand its military relationships and arms sales across West Africa. Should European, American or Israeli engagement weaken, Nigeria may increasingly gravitate toward these actors, whose governance standards and strategic goals may conflict with those of Western partners. 3. Common Interests and Complementary Added Value Europe, Israel, and the United States share a strategic interest in stabilizing Nigeria, though each brings different strengths to the table. When coordinated, their comparative advantages can produce an impact none could achieve alone. At the center of this alignment is the recognition that Nigeria’s crisis is simultaneously a security emergency, an institutional challenge, and a climate-driven socioeconomic problem. Addressing one dimension without the others has repeatedly failed; an integrated approach is therefore essential. In the security domain, Israel and the United States possess advanced operational capabilities that can significantly improve Nigeria’s ability to confront jihadists, criminal syndicates, and separatist groups. Israeli know-how in intelligence fusion, border surveillance, reconnaissance, and counter-IED tactics can provide Nigeria with immediate tactical gains. American engagement, whether through AFRICOM, training programs, or the Global Fragility Act, adds logistical depth, mobility, and political influence. European actors, for their part, excel at embedding such improvements within sustainable security-sector reform. They can help ensure that enhanced operational effectiveness is accompanied by improved accountability, human-rights compliance, and civilian oversight. The most promising avenue is therefore a coordinated effort in which Israeli and American operational support is paired with European governance standards, ensuring that Nigeria’s security architecture becomes both more effective and more legitimate. Modernizing Nigeria’s state institutions is equally crucial. Insurgents and criminal actors thrive in environments where identification systems are weak, financial flows opaque, and land ownership contested. Here, Europe’s long experience in institutional reform and public-administration modernization converges with Israel’s capabilities in cyber-security, digital identification, and anti-fraud technologies. The United States can supply the financial resources, technical assistance, and diplomatic weight required to scale such reforms nationwide. A combined effort could support Nigeria in creating secure civil registries, digital land-record systems, and transparent financial-management tools, thereby reducing corruption, improving service delivery, and strengthening citizens’ trust in the state. Climate security and agricultural modernization are equally urgent. Much of the violence in the Middle Belt is driven by competition over land and water. Israel’s experience in drip irrigation, desert agriculture, and water recycling offers concrete tools for reducing environmental pressures. Europe brings climate-adaptation financing and regulatory frameworks, while the United States contributes agricultural research and investment capacity. Joint programs could help rehabilitate degraded ecosystems, support pastoralist transition strategies, and develop climate-resilient farming zones, addressing structural drivers of conflict rather than merely its symptoms. These efforts would be reinforced by strategic coordination with Gulf states, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia, whose investments in Nigerian agriculture, infrastructure, and energy already shape the country’s economic landscape. Thanks to the Abraham Accords, Israel is now well positioned to participate in Gulf-backed projects, creating opportunities for multiregional stabilization initiatives in which Europe, the United States, Israel, and Gulf partners align their efforts rather than compete or duplicate them. A final area of convergence concerns maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, a vital corridor for global shipping and energy flows. The United States prioritizes maritime stability for strategic reasons; Europe for reasons of trade and energy security; and Israel for its offshore-surveillance technologies. Assisting Nigeria in strengthening its maritime domain awareness and protecting offshore infrastructure would directly reinforce national revenues and regional economic stability. In sum, Europe, Israel, and the United States bring highly complementary assets to Nigeria’s stabilization. Coordinated security assistance, digital-governance reform, climate-resilience programs, and maritime-security cooperation offer a realistic and impactful framework. Their shared interest in preventing Nigeria’s further destabilization, and in countering the growing influence of rival powers, makes such coordination both strategically necessary and politically feasible. Conclusion Nigeria’s national war is one of the defining strategic challenges of contemporary Africa. Its outcome will shape regional stability, the evolution of jihadist networks, international migration patterns and global energy markets. For Europe, Israel and especially the United States, Nigerian stability is a matter of both immediate and long-term strategic importance. While each actor brings distinct capabilities and interests, their strategic objectives are largely aligned, most clearly in the case of Israel and the United States, whose shared counterterrorism and geopolitical priorities converge in Nigeria. Nigeria’s crisis cannot be resolved quickly, but the combined engagement of Europe, Israel and the United States can meaningfully influence its trajectory. By pooling their comparative advantages (European governance reform, Israeli operational and technological expertise and American diplomatic and military leadership) these partners can help Nigeria strengthen its institutions, regain territorial control and address the structural drivers of conflict. A stable Nigeria is not only essential for West Africa’s future; it is vital for the strategic interests of all three partners and for the broader international community.