Executive Summary The disruption of the Strait of Hormuz in 2026 is not a temporary crisis but a systemic failure of global energy architecture. For decades, roughly 20 percent of global oil flows—and a critical share of liquefied natural gas—passed through a single maritime chokepoint exposed to geopolitical coercion. That model has now proven unsustainable. This paper argues that Hormuz cannot be replaced by a single alternative route. It must be neutralized through a network of land-based corridors. Existing solutions—Saudi and Emirati pipelines, Red Sea routes, and LNG workarounds—provide only partial mitigation. Other proposed corridors, such as the Iraq–Turkey axis, are undermined by instability, while large-scale initiatives like IMEC remain incomplete. By contrast, an integrated Gulf–Levant–Mediterranean corridor, linking Gulf energy to Europe via Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel, offers the most credible long-term solution. Anchored in the Abraham Accords, it combines geopolitical reliability, direct market access, and strategic alignment with Western partners. Its realization depends on expanding normalization, particularly between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The policy implication is clear: the United States must drive diplomatic alignment, Israel must position itself as a regional hub, and Europe must invest proactively in corridor infrastructure. The next three years will determine whether a resilient post-Hormuz system emerges—or whether vulnerability persists. Introduction The disruption of the Strait of Hormuz in 2026 marks a turning point in the history of global energy security. What was long treated as a manageable risk—a narrow maritime chokepoint through which a significant share of the world’s energy flows—has become an active instrument of geopolitical coercion. The consequences have been immediate: disrupted supply chains, price volatility, and a renewed awareness of the fragility of global energy infrastructure. This paper argues that the crisis of Hormuz is not merely an event, but a structural revelation. It exposes the unsustainability of a system built on the concentration of flows through a single, vulnerable corridor. The solution, therefore, cannot be incremental. It must be systemic. Energy security must be redefined not as access to resources, but as control over diversified, resilient routes. Within this framework, the paper advances a clear thesis: while multiple alternatives to Hormuz exist, only a land-based corridor system anchored in the Abraham Accords—linking the Gulf to the Mediterranean via Israel—can provide a durable, geopolitically coherent solution. Such a system would not only bypass maritime chokepoints but also align infrastructure with a new regional order based on cooperation among pro-Western states. The challenge is therefore twofold: to design a credible corridor architecture, and to align the political conditions necessary for its realization. The following sections assess existing alternatives, compare competing corridor models, and demonstrate why an Abraham Accords–based system offers the most viable path forward. I. Hormuz as a Structural Failure of the Global Energy System The Strait of Hormuz has long been recognized as the most critical chokepoint in the global energy system. At its peak, approximately 20 million barrels of oil per day—alongside a substantial share of global LNG exports—transited through this narrow passage. Yet despite repeated warnings, the international system failed to develop sufficient alternatives. The events of 2026 have transformed this vulnerability into a systemic crisis. The disruption of flows has not only constrained supply but has also triggered cascading effects across global markets. Oil prices have surged, gas markets have tightened, and competition for alternative supplies has intensified. Europe, in particular, has experienced the indirect consequences of this disruption through price shocks and supply uncertainty, despite limited direct dependence on Gulf imports. This crisis underscores a fundamental reality: energy flows are geopolitical instruments. Control over transit routes confers strategic leverage, allowing states to influence markets, exert pressure, and shape outcomes beyond their immediate region. The structural failure lies in the overconcentration of these flows. A system optimized for efficiency—minimizing transport costs and transit times—has sacrificed resilience. The result is a fragile architecture in which disruption at a single point produces global consequences. The lesson is clear. The future of energy security must be built on redundancy, diversification, and geopolitical alignment. This requires a shift from maritime dependence to a more complex, layered system of land-based corridors. II. Existing Alternatives: Mitigation Without Transformation In response to the vulnerability of Hormuz, Gulf states have developed a limited set of bypass infrastructures. Saudi Arabia’s East–West pipeline (Petroline) and the UAE’s Habshan–Fujairah pipeline are the most significant examples. These infrastructures provide valuable redundancy. The Petroline, with a capacity of up to 7 million barrels per day, allows Saudi Arabia to redirect exports to the Red Sea. The UAE’s pipeline enables direct access to the Gulf of Oman, bypassing Hormuz altogether. However, their limitations are structural. Even at full capacity, these pipelines can compensate for only a portion of the flows typically transiting Hormuz. A substantial gap—estimated at over 10 million barrels per day—remains unaddressed. Moreover, these routes introduce new vulnerabilities. The Red Sea, increasingly contested, cannot serve as a fully secure alternative. Fixed infrastructure is also inherently exposed to attack, as demonstrated by recent strikes on energy facilities across the region. Hybrid solutions, such as combining pipelines with LNG transport via the Red Sea and Suez Canal, offer additional flexibility. Yet they come at higher costs and remain dependent on maritime routes that are themselves vulnerable to disruption. These alternatives share a common limitation: they mitigate the symptoms of the problem without addressing its underlying structure. They provide continuity, but not transformation. III. Competing Corridor Models: Between Opportunity and Constraint Beyond existing infrastructure, several land-based corridor models have emerged as potential alternatives. Each reflects a different balance of technical feasibility, political risk, and geopolitical alignment. The Iraq–Turkey corridor, often referred to as the Development Road, offers a direct route from the Gulf to the Mediterranean. Its advantages include shorter transit times and potential scalability. However, its viability is undermined by Iraq’s internal instability, fragmented governance, and exposure to external influence—particularly from Iran. In addition, its alignment with broader Chinese connectivity initiatives raises questions about its long-term geopolitical orientation. The IMEC initiative represents a more ambitious approach. By integrating ports, railways, pipelines, and digital infrastructure, it seeks to create a comprehensive connectivity system linking India, the Gulf, and Europe. Its strategic logic is compelling: it reduces reliance on both Hormuz and the Suez Canal, while aligning participating states within a Western-oriented framework. Yet IMEC remains a project in development. Key infrastructure components are incomplete, financing mechanisms are not fully established, and its success depends on political alignment across multiple states. In particular, the absence of full normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel remains a critical constraint. These models illustrate the broader challenge. Technical solutions exist, but their viability depends on political conditions. The most effective corridors are not simply those that can be built, but those that can be secured, aligned, and sustained over time. IV. The Abraham Accords Corridor: A Strategic Alternative Against this backdrop, the most credible alternative to Hormuz is an integrated corridor system linking the Gulf to the Mediterranean through the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant, anchored in the framework of the Abraham Accords. This system would combine multiple components into a unified architecture: Gulf production and export infrastructure Saudi and regional pipeline networks A land bridge through Jordan Israeli transit infrastructure, including the Eilat–Ashkelon pipeline Mediterranean export terminals connected to European markets The strategic logic of this configuration is compelling. First, it provides a continuous land-based route from the Gulf to Europe, bypassing both Hormuz and other maritime chokepoints. Second, it leverages existing and scalable infrastructure, reducing the need for entirely new systems. Third, it aligns with a network of states that share an interest in stability, economic integration, and cooperation with Western partners. Israel plays a central role in this system. Its geographic position, technological capabilities, and established infrastructure make it uniquely suited to function as a hub. The Eilat–Ashkelon pipeline, in particular, offers a direct connection between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, forming the backbone of a trans-regional energy corridor. The Abraham Accords provide the political foundation for this architecture. By normalizing relations between Israel and several Arab states, they have transformed the regional landscape. What was once politically unthinkable—energy cooperation across these lines—has become increasingly plausible. This corridor is not merely an alternative route. It represents a reconfiguration of regional energy geography, linking economic integration to strategic alignment. V. From Opportunity to Implementation: Policy Pathways The realization of this corridor depends on translating strategic logic into political and operational reality. For the United States, the priority is to leverage its diplomatic influence to advance normalization—particularly between Saudi Arabia and Israel—and to integrate infrastructure development into a broader regional strategy. This includes coordinating investment, providing security guarantees, and aligning partners around a shared vision. For Israel, the challenge is to position itself as both a security provider and a reliable economic partner. This requires not only maintaining its strategic posture, but also investing in infrastructure, regulatory frameworks, and regional partnerships that facilitate integration. For Europe, the imperative is to shift from reactive adaptation to proactive engagement. This means treating corridor development as a strategic priority, mobilizing financial instruments, and engaging directly with regional partners. Europe must recognize that energy security is no longer a matter of supply contracts, but of infrastructure and geopolitics. The window for action is limited. The convergence of strategic interests created by the current crisis will not persist indefinitely. Delays risk entrenching alternative pathways or allowing competing powers to shape the emerging architecture. Conclusion: Building the Post-Hormuz Order The crisis of the Strait of Hormuz marks the end of a model based on concentrated maritime flows and the illusion of stability. The future of energy security lies in diversified, resilient, and geopolitically aligned corridor systems. Among the available options, the Abraham Accords–based Gulf–Levant–Mediterranean corridor offers the most credible path forward. It combines strategic logic, political alignment, and economic opportunity in a way that no other alternative does. Its realization will require coordinated action, sustained investment, and political will. But the stakes are clear. The choice is between a system defined by vulnerability and one defined by resilience. The post-Hormuz order will not emerge automatically. It must be built—deliberately, strategically, and in partnership among those who have the greatest interest in its success.