Hungary After Orbán: What Changes for Israel?

Executive Summary Péter Magyar’s victory in the Hungarian parliamentary elections of April 2026 marks a major political shift in Central Europe and carries important implications for Israel. Under Viktor Orbán, Hungary had become one of Israel’s most reliable allies within the European Union, often using its institutional leverage to block or dilute anti-Israeli initiatives in Brussels. The close relationship between Orbán and Benjamin Netanyahu was built not only on political cooperation but also on ideological affinity. Both leaders promoted conservative narratives centred on national sovereignty, opposition to mass migration, criticism of ‘wokeness’, and the defence of what they described as Judeo-Christian civilisation. Magyar’s rise does not imply that Hungary will adopt openly hostile policies toward Israel. Budapest is unlikely to follow the path taken by governments such as Spain or Ireland. However, Hungary’s role as Israel’s principal defender inside the EU is expected to diminish considerably. Magyar has already announced that Hungary will rejoin the International Criminal Court, and the EU may gain greater room for manoeuvre on policies targeting the Israeli government or elements of the settler movement. The Orbán-Netanyahu partnership also served broader geopolitical purposes. Orbán used ties with Israel to strengthen his links with conservative circles and the Jewish diaspora in the United States, particularly during the Biden administration. Netanyahu, meanwhile, sought to cultivate pro-Israeli positions among Central and Eastern European states as a counterweight to Western European criticism. Ultimately, however, the partnership produced limited strategic gains for both sides. Orbán lost power despite strong support from Donald Trump’s political camp, while Netanyahu failed to build a durable Central European bloc capable of reshaping EU policy toward Israel. Relations between Budapest and Jerusalem are therefore entering a new phase: one likely to remain pragmatic and functional, but without the ideological intimacy and political coordination that characterised the previous era. The End of an Exceptional Political Partnership For most European political leaders and pundits, Péter Magyar’s and his TISZA party’s victory in the Hungarian parliamentary elections on 12 April came as no surprise. For months, Magyar had consistently held a substantial lead in the polls over Viktor Orbán’s right-wing Fidesz. Despite a fierce, at times brutal, campaign, the incumbent prime minister, who had governed Budapest since 2010, ultimately failed to secure re-election. The triumph of Péter Magyar, a pro-European liberal, was enthusiastically welcomed by European Union elites and major capitals across the Old Continent. Although Magyar had been a key Fidesz figure just two years prior, he had parted ways with Orbán and cultivated an image of a man capable of “fixing” Hungary. This was a significant shift, given the years of rule by Orbán’s party which had undermined the rule of law, deepened corruption, entrenched nepotism, and resulted in meagre economic growth. Hungary, in terms of its size and population, is considered a European ‘middle-ranker’. However, its unique relationship with the EU and the bloc’s legal and institutional framework have given Budapest a disproportionately influential role within Europe, far exceeding its actual political weight. Over recent years Viktor Orbán effectively used institutional tools to delay, water down, or even veto certain EU decisions on common foreign policy, particularly concerning Ukraine, Russia, and Israel. While Hungary, despite its close ties with the Kremlin, generally supported sanctions against the Russian Federation, it successfully blocked many EU initiatives targeting Benjamin Netanyahu’s government in Israel. This included opposition to suspending the Association Agreement granting Israel access to EU programmes and funds, as well as resistance to joint statements calling for a “humanitarian pause” or ceasefire during Israeli military operations in Gaza. When Netanyahu was formally charged by the International Criminal Court in The Hague with war crimes and crimes against humanity, Orbán withdrew Hungary from the institution. This move was designed in part to allow the Israeli prime minister to visit Budapest without fear of arrest. This is precisely what happened in April last year, after the authorities in Budapest had already initiated the relevant procedure, when Netanyahu availed himself of the informal immunity offered by his Hungarian counterpart. During that visit, Viktor Orbán declared: “From the very first moment, Hungary made it clear that we stand up for Israel’s sovereignty, its right to self-defence, and the security of the Israeli people; and we have represented this position in world politics everywhere ever since… Israel can count on Hungary in the future as an impregnable European bastion of Judeo-Christian culture.” From Ideological Alignment to Strategic Distance Péter Magyar’s rise to power presents a significant challenge for the current government in Jerusalem. It does not necessarily herald a complete rupture in bilateral relations, but ties between the two countries are unlikely to remain as close as they were under Orbán. One telling example is Magyar’s announcement that Hungary will return to the ICC as a signatory to the Rome Statute. In addition, the European Union will likely enjoy greater room for manoeuvre when it comes to imposing restrictions on radical settler figures or Israeli ministers associated with them. An era has therefore come to an end in relations between Budapest and Jerusalem. Orbán and Netanyahu were connected not only by personal ties but also by ideological affinity. Netanyahu — much like Donald Trump — openly supported the Fidesz leader ahead of the elections. In a pre-recorded message shown at a CPAC conference, he declared that “Viktor Orbán means security and stability for Hungary.” Netanyahu’s son, Yair, went even further, referring to Budapest as “his second home.” Both leaders frequently emphasised common conservative values and a shared struggle against global “wokeness”. The defence of “Judeo-Christian civilisation” — particularly against the perceived rise of Islamism and the effects of mass migration — was a recurring theme in their public rhetoric. They also shared criticism of Western European governments, which — in their view — had failed both to control mass immigration and to confront growing anti-Semitism. This perception reinforced their conviction that many Western European states were becoming increasingly hostile toward Israel. Interestingly, Orbán himself had to manoeuvre carefully around the issue of anti-Semitism within Hungary. On the one hand, he sought to minimise the role played by the wartime Hungarian state under Admiral Miklós Horthy in the extermination of Hungarian Jewry. His political camp and aligned media also conducted a long-running campaign against George Soros that many critics described as carrying anti-Semitic undertones. On the other hand, Orbán repeatedly stressed that modern Hungary was “the safest country for Jews” in Europe. Compared with many Western European countries, anti-Semitic incidents in Hungary have indeed remained limited in recent years. This was due in large part to low levels of immigration from Muslim-majority countries, though Orbán also took measures such as banning anti-Israeli demonstrations after the outbreak of the Gaza war. The Limits of the Orbán–Netanyahu Axis Both Netanyahu and Orbán used their personal relationship to expand their influence in other areas of international politics. For the Hungarian prime minister, close ties with Israel also provided an indirect channel to conservative American circles and parts of the Jewish diaspora in the United States. This became particularly important during Joe Biden’s presidency, when relations between Budapest and Washington deteriorated sharply. Summit meetings ceased, Hungarian officials faced restricted access to the U.S. administration, and Orbán’s government increasingly relied on outreach to conservative opposition figures and allied networks in America. In that sense, placing political hopes on Donald Trump’s return to power proved, at least temporarily, successful. In November last year, Orbán was received at the White House; Trump publicly endorsed him; and JD Vance travelled personally to Budapest shortly before the April elections. Yet these efforts ultimately failed to prevent a major electoral defeat for Fidesz. For Benjamin Netanyahu, meanwhile, the alliance with Orbán formed part of a broader effort to cultivate divisions within Europe — between “old” and “new” Europe, between Western European democracies and the states of Central and Eastern Europe. This strategy was reflected in Israel’s active engagement with the Visegrád Group (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia), the Baltic states, and Romania. Yet the results remained mixed. Relations with Hungary and the Czech Republic were consistently strong, ties with Slovakia remained lukewarm, and relations with Poland were repeatedly strained by historical and disputes. Moreover, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many governments in Central and Eastern Europe became increasingly distrustful of Israel because Jerusalem — concerned about preserving relations with Moscow — initially avoided strongly condemning Russia or joining the sanctions regime. Ultimately, the Orbán–Netanyahu partnership produced fewer strategic gains than either side had anticipated. Orbán enjoyed elevated international visibility within Trump-aligned conservative circles but still suffered a decisive defeat at home. Netanyahu, meanwhile, failed to establish a durable pro-Israeli bloc inside the European Union capable of counterbalancing major Western European powers such as France or Spain. A Pragmatic but Less Intimate Relationship It is possible that within months Hungary’s new prime minister may also be dealing with a new Israeli prime minister following the Knesset elections tentatively scheduled for autumn 2026. Yet Benjamin Netanyahu could equally remain in power. What already seems clear, however, is that relations between Budapest and Jerusalem are entering a fundamentally different phase. Péter Magyar is unlikely to pursue openly hostile policies toward Israel, unlike several European governments such as Spain, Ireland, or Belgium. He understands that relations within the Budapest–Washington–Jerusalem triangle remain strategically important, particularly from the perspective of Hungary’s security and its role within NATO. He is also aware that a direct confrontation with Israel would be poorly received in Washington. Magyar will additionally seek to preserve good relations with Jewish communities both in Hungary and abroad, particularly in the United States. Nevertheless, the period of ideological closeness and personal affinity between the leaders of Hungary and Israel has come to an end. Future relations are likely to remain pragmatic and functional, but far less political, emotional, and strategically aligned than during the Orbán era.