Executive Summary Europe’s policy toward Iran increasingly intersects with domestic security, foreign influence, and institutional resilience. Across the United Kingdom and continental Europe, mosques, hussainiyas (Shia congregation halls), matams (Shia mourning and commemoration centres), Islamic centres, charities, welfare associations, and educational institutions form part of legitimate and protected civic life. The challenge emerges where legitimate institutions become vulnerable to foreign-state-linked influence through clerical patronage, ideology, or opaque financial dependence. The Gulf offers a longer-term case study. For years Bahrain and Kuwait publicly debated religious finance, clerical authority, and cross-border networks linked to Iran. Those debates often remained politically sensitive and difficult to resolve. Today, amid renewed regional escalation, they offer lessons increasingly relevant for Europe. Introduction The presence of established Shia Muslim institutions across Europe has become an increasingly important issue within wider debates on Iranian foreign influence, transnational finance, and hybrid security threats. Across the United Kingdom and continental Europe, mosques, hussainiyas (Shia congregation halls), matams (Shia mourning and commemoration centres), Islamic centres, charities, welfare associations, and educational institutions form part of legitimate and protected civic life. Most operate independently and lawfully within democratic legal systems. Yet rising tensions across the Middle East and growing concern regarding Iranian state-linked networks have increased scrutiny of how religious institutions, charitable financing, and transnational clerical relationships intersect with strategic influence. A particularly sensitive area involves khums—an Arabic term meaning “one-fifth”, a longstanding religious contribution in Twelver Shia Islam traditionally requiring believers to dedicate a defined portion of certain qualifying surplus income through recognized clerical authority for religious, charitable, and community purposes. For many Shia Muslims, khums is an important and legitimate expression of religious practice. The policy concern emerges where funds collected under that framework move through opaque institutional channels across borders and become difficult to trace. Recent developments in Bahrain and Kuwait elevated this issue. Bahrain announced the arrest of a 41-person cell linked to Iranian state-aligned activity and reported approximately 600,000 Bahraini dinars (around US$1.59 million) found in the residence of one suspect. Bahrain also shut down nine charitable and social organizations while tightening fundraising oversight. In Kuwait, recent investigations revived earlier parliamentary concerns first raised publicly in 2018 by former minister Hind Al-Sabeeh, who questioned where religiously collected funds were ultimately going. Across Europe, several Shia religious institutions have also drawn attention from regulators and national authorities over governance concerns, links to Iranian clerical structures, or questions surrounding foreign-state aligned political activity. Taken together, the Gulf and European experience increasingly suggests that democratic governments should strengthen financial transparency and institutional oversight while preserving religious freedom and lawful worship. The Shia Institutional Landscape and Financial Networks Europe’s Shia institutional landscape is visible and deeply rooted. In London, Berlin, Paris, Brussels, and other cities, Shia centres frequently provide worship, majalis (religious gatherings and sermons), Ashura commemorations, welfare services, youth engagement, educational programming, and charitable support. Religious institutions often serve as trusted civic spaces over generations. That trust is precisely why governance and financial transparency become sensitive. The policy issue is not worship or sectarian identity. The issue is whether institutions with deep communal legitimacy may become vulnerable to political or financial influence through transnational clerical or organizational relationships. That complexity is visible both in Europe and the Gulf. Financial oversight remains one of the most politically sensitive dimensions of institutional scrutiny. Within Twelver Shia Islam, khums—an Arabic term meaning “one-fifth”—is a recognized and protected religious obligation requiring believers to contribute a defined portion of qualifying surplus income through clerical authority. Historically, the term appears in the Qur’an (8:41), which refers to setting aside one-fifth of certain gains: “And know that whatever you acquire, one-fifth of it belongs to God, the Messenger…” From that scriptural foundation, Islamic legal schools developed different interpretations regarding how the obligation applies. In Twelver Shia Islam, khums evolved into a religious duty applied to certain qualifying surplus income after living expenses and other conditions. It is traditionally distributed through recognized clerical authority. The funds are commonly divided into two parts: Sahm al-Imam (“the Imam’s share”) — traditionally associated with religious institutions, seminaries, and clerical authority. Sahm al-Sada (“the share of the descendants of the Prophet”), traditionally allocated as charitable support for eligible descendants of the Prophet. The term itself is literal: khums means one-fifth, or twenty percent, and its religious meaning developed over centuries of Islamic jurisprudence. For followers aligned with Iran’s doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, khums may be directed through clerical offices linked to the office of the Supreme Leader (the Imam). Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, that religious-political authority has been associated with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and now Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, following the leadership transition in 2026. This institutional relationship carries strategic significance because the Islamic Republic integrates religious authority with state power. Critics and regional governments have long argued that where religious financial obligations move through opaque channels tied to Iranian state institutions, the distinction between clerical authority, charitable funding, and state-linked political activity can become difficult to assess. That concern carries added significance because the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a central institution of the Iranian state, is designated as a terrorist organization by multiple governments, while remaining subject to extensive sanctions and heightened political scrutiny in the United Kingdom and across Europe. For millions of Shia Muslims, khums remains a respected and legitimate expression of religious practice. The policy concern does not arise from khums itself. The concern arises where religious legitimacy and community trust are exploited in ways that reduce transparency over where funds move and who ultimately controls them. In Kuwait, former minister and parliamentarian Hind Al-Sabeeh publicly raised concerns in 2018 regarding where religiously collected funds were going and whether sufficient oversight existed. Years later, those concerns resurfaced after Kuwaiti investigations into cells and parliamentarians financing networks linked to Iranian and Hezbollah-aligned actors. Bahrain reinforced similar concerns. Authorities announced the arrest of a 41-person cell to be linked to Iranian state-aligned activity. Local reporting noted approximately 600,000 Bahraini dinars (around US$1.59 million) found in the residence of one suspect. Bahrain also shut down nine charitable and social organizations while tightening fundraising controls. Across both countries, public debate increasingly focused on whether one of the most sensitive fundraising pathways involved exploiting trust surrounding khums and related religious donations. For policymakers, the distinction matters. Khums itself is legitimate. The concern is whether foreign-state aligned actors may exploit religious legitimacy, clerical authority, and community trust to collect funds and redirect them through opaque channels benefiting the IRGC or affiliated proxy networks. Regulatory Cases in the EU and in the UK European scrutiny has not focused on Shia worship or matam practices themselves. However, several prominent Shia institutions and affiliated religious centres have drawn attention from regulators and national authorities where governance, political alignment, or foreign-state linked activity became concerns. Below are a few examples: The Islamic Centre of England (United Kingdom) The Islamic Centre of England in London has faced Charity Commission scrutiny over governance concerns and compliance failures. British authorities and policymakers also examined links to Iranian clerical authority and messaging connected to sanctioned Iranian figures. The Islamic Centre Hamburg (Germany) Germany’s closure of the Islamic Centre Hamburg represented one of Europe’s most significant cases. Authorities concluded that relationships with Iranian political structures raised wider national security concerns. The ARK Islamic Centre (Scotland) The ARK Islamic Centre in Glasgow drew public attention after being linked to Iranian election-related activity. The Mahdi Servants Union A UK-based Shia organization associated with majalis and Ashura gatherings drew police attention following a diplomatic incident involving the Azerbaijani embassy. Lessons from the Gulf Monarchies The Gulf experience offers Europe an institutional warning developed over decades. In Bahrain and Kuwait, concerns surrounding ideology and finance did not emerge suddenly. They developed gradually through trusted religious and charitable structures. By the time operational concerns became visible, many institutional relationships had already become normalized. That lesson increasingly applies to Europe. Across Britain and continental Europe, Shia institutions continue to collect charitable and religious funds lawfully and remain legitimate parts of democratic civic life. The overwhelming majority operate independently and responsibly. But Gulf experience demonstrates why policymakers require stronger visibility over financial governance where cross-border clerical or institutional relationships exist. The Kuwaiti experience is particularly instructive. Questions raised publicly in parliament in 2018 only gained renewed urgency years later after alleged financing networks became a national security issue. Bahrain’s enforcement actions reinforced similar concerns. The lesson is not suspicion toward religion. It is legal precision, financial transparency, and institutional accountability where credible questions arise. Policy Implications Several policy implications follow. First, democratic governments should continue protecting lawful worship and religious freedom while strengthening financial reporting standards where cross-border religious transfers occur. Second, regulators should improve transparency regarding intermediary charities, clerical representatives, and institutional fundraising linked across multiple jurisdictions. Third, governments should distinguish clearly between protected religious practice and cases involving opaque financial governance or foreign-state linked political activity. Fourth, early scrutiny matters. The Gulf demonstrates that politically sensitive questions surrounding religious finance can remain unresolved for years before becoming visible as national security concerns. The importance of this issue extends beyond immediate financial oversight. Iran’s regional strategy has historically relied not only on military and diplomatic instruments, but also on long-term ideological and institutional relationships developed across borders. Religious legitimacy and clerical influence can create durable infrastructure through which trust is built, networks are maintained, and transnational relationships remain resilient over time. That broader context helps explain why scrutiny surrounding religious finance has intensified. The concern increasingly involves whether long-standing charitable and religious structures operating across jurisdictions may also function as stable channels through which political alignment and financial dependency are reinforced. Stronger transparency is not a challenge to religious freedom. It is one of the strongest protections available to preserve trust, prevent external political exploitation, and ensure legitimate religious institutions remain independent and resilient. Conclusion Europe’s Shia institutional landscape remains an established and legitimate part of democratic civic life. That freedom should remain protected. At the same time, the Gulf experience demonstrates how financial and ideological influence linked to Iran may move gradually through religious and charitable structures before becoming politically visible. The debate surrounding khums in Bahrain and Kuwait is especially important because it highlights how legitimate religious financial obligations can become strategically significant where oversight is weak and destination becomes unclear. Recent developments—including Bahrain’s arrest of a 41-person network, discovery of approximately US$1.59 million in one suspect’s residence, closure of nine organizations, renewed Kuwaiti scrutiny tied to earlier parliamentary questioning, and multiple European regulatory cases involving Shia institutions, have reinforced wider concern that trusted religious institutions and protected financial obligations may, under certain circumstances, become vulnerable to external political influence or opaque financial transfer. For the European Union and the United Kingdom, the policy challenge is clear: How to protect religious freedom while ensuring that religious and charitable financial structures remain transparent, accountable, and resilient against external political instrumentalization? The Gulf experience suggests that early institutional awareness matters. Where credible questions arise, stronger transparency and proportionate scrutiny are most effective before long-standing networks become difficult to assess or become durable channels of foreign-state influence.