Executive Summary Polish President Karol Nawrocki’s June 2026 visit to Turkey, shortly before the NATO summit in Ankara, highlighted the growing strategic relevance of Polish-Turkish relations within the Alliance. The relationship rests on a long and complex historical memory, but its current significance is primarily geopolitical. Poland and Turkey are increasingly central to NATO’s eastern security architecture: Poland in the Baltic region and Turkey in the Black Sea basin and the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s policy toward Russia remains ambivalent. Ankara maintains economic and diplomatic ties with Moscow, has not joined the Western sanctions regime, and remains burdened by the consequences of its S-400 purchase. Yet Turkey has also opposed Russian aggression in Ukraine, confronted Moscow in Syria and the Caucasus, and plays a major role in Black Sea security. For Warsaw, closer relations with Ankara are therefore both necessary and strategic. Poland seeks to draw Turkey closer to the Central and Eastern European view of Russia as a long-term threat, while expanding cooperation in defence industry, drones, electronic warfare, energy security, and NATO operations. At the Ankara NATO summit, Poland and Turkey will matter not only because of their military size and defence spending, but because both countries sit at the heart of the Alliance’s evolving eastern flank. A Historical Relationship Reframed On 23 June 2026, Polish President Karol Nawrocki paid an official visit to Turkey, where he was received in Ankara by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. He also visited the Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey and met Polish soldiers stationed there. The visit was significant for several reasons. It took place shortly before the NATO summit in Ankara, which President Nawrocki is also expected to attend. It also symbolically underlined the growing importance of Poland and Turkey within the North Atlantic Alliance. Finally, it marked another step in the strengthening of bilateral relations, increasingly based on military and strategic cooperation. Turkey, and before it the Ottoman Empire, occupies an important place in Polish historical memory. The most famous reference is the victory of King John III Sobieski at Vienna in 1683, when Polish-led European forces defeated the Ottoman army commanded by Kara Mustafa. In Polish historical consciousness, the battle has often been described as a defence of Christian Europe, much as the battle of Poitiers in 732 has been portrayed in French historiography. For centuries, the Ottoman Empire regarded Poland as a major political and military actor in Europe, while Polish rulers often described their monarchy as a “bulwark of Christianity.” Yet the later history of Polish-Turkish relations was shaped less by religious rivalry than by a shared adversary: Russia. During the period of Poland’s partitions, especially in the nineteenth century, many Poles hoped that the Sublime Porte would become an ally in their struggle to regain independence. This was one of the reasons why Adam Mickiewicz, Poland’s greatest poet, travelled to Constantinople in September 1855 during the Crimean War. His mission was to help establish a Polish Legion that would fight Russia alongside Turkey, Britain, and France. Mickiewicz died suddenly in Constantinople in November of that year, probably of cholera, before completing his mission. Equally striking is the story of Józef Bem, one of Poland’s most famous military commanders. After taking part in revolutionary struggles in Poland and the Habsburg Empire during the Spring of Nations, Bem emigrated to the Ottoman Empire, converted to Islam, adopted the title of pasha, and became a general in the Ottoman army. To this day, he is remembered as a hero in Poland, Hungary, and Turkey. Poland’s Pragmatic Approach to Erdoğan’s Turkey Today, relations between Warsaw and Ankara remain exceptional, particularly when compared with Turkey’s relations with many other European countries. Unlike several EU member states, Poland has generally been restrained in its public criticism of Turkey over the rule of law, freedom of speech, and the Kurdish question. Warsaw has also consistently supported Turkey’s accession process to the European Union. During the joint press conference in Ankara, Erdoğan thanked Poland for supporting Turkey’s EU membership bid and expressed hope that this support would continue. It is also worth recalling that Nawrocki’s predecessor, President Andrzej Duda, and the conservative government of Mateusz Morawiecki were involved in efforts to persuade Erdoğan to soften his opposition to Sweden’s accession to NATO. The logic behind this Polish approach is strategic. Warsaw does not view Turkey merely as a difficult ally. It sees Turkey as a country whose position, capabilities, and regional influence make it indispensable to NATO’s security architecture. From the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea “It is impossible to build responsibility on NATO’s eastern flank without recognising the enormous potential that Poland brings in the north, along with its responsibility for the Baltic Sea, and Turkey’s responsibility in the Black Sea basin,” President Nawrocki emphasised in Ankara. These were perhaps the most meaningful words uttered by the Polish leader during his visit. They illustrate the growing importance of Poland and Turkey within NATO’s new strategic constellation, as well as the geopolitical relevance of the two maritime basins in question. Nawrocki’s use of the phrase “eastern flank” is particularly significant. Until recently, the term was associated mainly with Central and Eastern Europe and with the countries grouped in the Bucharest Nine: Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Yet a glance at the map suggests that Turkey, in strategic terms, also belongs to NATO’s eastern flank. This is especially true today, as both the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea have become theatres of military, economic, and political confrontation with Russia. Not all states bordering the Baltic Sea directly border the Russian Federation. Turkey does not share a land border with Russia either. But both seas, and their surrounding regions, have become central to the future of NATO deterrence. The Alliance’s centre of gravity has shifted eastwards. Closer coordination between Poland and Turkey is therefore not an artificial project, but a natural consequence of Europe’s changing strategic geography. Turkey’s Ambiguous Relationship with Russia This does not mean that Turkish policy toward Russia is identical to Poland’s. Far from it. Unlike most countries of the Bucharest Nine, Turkey has sought to maintain a working relationship with Moscow. President Erdoğan and President Vladimir Putin have continued to meet, while Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan recently visited Russia. Ankara and Moscow maintain significant economic ties, and Turkey has not joined the sanctions regime imposed on Russia by much of the Western world after the invasion of Ukraine. There are also major areas of strategic interdependence. Rosatom is building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant at Akkuyu, whose first reactor is expected to begin operating by the end of 2026 after repeated delays. Russian tourists remain an important source of revenue for Turkey’s tourism sector. Each summer, large numbers of Russian visitors travel to Turkish resorts. Yet the relationship between Ankara and Moscow is far from harmonious. In 2015, a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian aircraft operating from the Khmeimim base in Syria, triggering a serious crisis between the two countries. Turkey and Russia have also backed opposing sides in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and the South Caucasus. Ankara has long supported Azerbaijan, while Moscow historically aligned itself with Armenia, even though Yerevan has recently begun to distance itself from Russia. Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 air defence systems also had far-reaching consequences. It led to a deterioration in relations with Washington and to Turkey’s suspension from the F-35 programme. Turkey’s Russia policy is therefore best understood as a mixture of rivalry, interdependence, and tactical cooperation. This ambiguity is precisely why Poland considers engagement with Turkey so important. Warsaw’s Strategic Objective One of the priorities of successive Polish governments, regardless of their political orientation, has been to persuade key regional actors to adopt the Polish and Central European understanding of Russia’s aggressive policy. This effort has not always succeeded. Hungary remains the most striking example of divergence within Central Europe. But in Turkey’s case, quiet pressure from Warsaw and other regional capitals may have contributed to Ankara’s clearly critical stance toward Russia’s actions in Ukraine, even if Turkey has not joined Western sanctions. Poland’s objective is not to transform Turkey into another Baltic state. That would be unrealistic. Rather, Warsaw seeks to ensure that Ankara’s inevitable pragmatism toward Moscow does not weaken NATO’s deterrence posture. This is where the Baltic–Black Sea axis becomes strategically important. For 14 years, Poland, Turkey, and Romania have maintained a trilateral format of cooperation, often referred to as the “Trilogue.” This framework reflects Poland’s long-standing interest in connecting the security concerns of the Baltic and Black Sea regions. Both areas are also central to Europe’s energy security, which has for years been a key element of Poland’s strategic thinking. The presence of Polish soldiers at Incirlik fits into this broader approach. Polish personnel contribute to patrol missions over the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. During his visit to the base, President Nawrocki announced the extension of the Polish contingent’s mandate. Defence Industry and the Lessons of Ukraine The war in Ukraine has accelerated military-technological change, particularly in drones, electronic warfare, air defence, and battlefield integration. Both Warsaw and Ankara are watching these changes closely. Five years ago, Poland signed a contract to purchase 24 Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles from Turkey. These drones conduct reconnaissance missions and have also been deployed at Incirlik. Turkish defence companies are now seeking further opportunities in Poland, aware that Warsaw has become one of NATO’s most ambitious defence spenders. During his visit to Turkey, President Nawrocki visited the headquarters of ASELSAN, a major Turkish defence company specialising in areas including electronic warfare, air defence, radar, communications, and jamming systems. This defence-industrial dimension is likely to become increasingly important. Poland is rapidly expanding and modernising its armed forces. Turkey, for its part, has built a significant defence-industrial base and has become an exporter of drones, armoured vehicles, electronic systems, and naval platforms. The convergence is clear: Poland needs capabilities at speed and scale; Turkey seeks reliable European partners and markets. Both countries also understand that the next phase of NATO deterrence will depend not only on troop numbers and defence budgets, but on technological adaptation. Implications for NATO At the upcoming NATO summit in Ankara, the voices of Poland and Turkey will carry particular weight. Both countries take their alliance commitments seriously. Over the past decade, they have substantially increased defence spending. Poland now ranks among NATO’s most committed defence spenders as a share of GDP, while Turkey continues to maintain one of the Alliance’s largest militaries. But the most important factor will not be numbers alone. It will be the ability of Warsaw and Ankara to influence NATO’s overall posture toward Russia. Here, their perspectives differ but do not necessarily collide. Poland views Russia as the central and long-term threat to European security. Turkey sees Russia as both a rival and a neighbour with which it must manage unavoidable strategic and economic ties. The challenge for NATO is to turn this difference into a division of labour rather than a source of paralysis. Poland can help keep the Alliance focused on deterrence, resilience, and the defence of the eastern flank. Turkey can contribute military depth, regional access, Black Sea experience, and defence-industrial capacity. The Polish-Turkish partnership will not eliminate Ankara’s ambiguities toward Moscow. Nor will it make Turkey an easy ally. But it can help anchor Turkey more firmly within NATO’s strategic response to Russia. That is why Nawrocki’s visit to Ankara mattered. It was not merely a bilateral gesture. It was a signal that NATO’s eastern flank now stretches from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, and that Poland and Turkey will be central to shaping its future.