Executive Summary The confrontation between the world’s greatest powers is being played out on many fronts. Technological rivalry is doubtless one of the most important. Advanced semiconductors have become indispensable to artificial intelligence, economic development, military capabilities, and intelligence gathering. Access to them is therefore no longer governed solely by market forces, but increasingly by considerations of national security and geopolitical alignment. In January 2025, the Biden administration introduced the AI Diffusion Rule, which divided countries into different categories according to their level of access to the most advanced American chips and artificial-intelligence technologies. The Trump administration rescinded the rule in May 2025, replacing its uniform country classification with a more transactional and bilateral approach. The Gulf states have emerged as important participants in this new technological diplomacy. On 10 July 2026, the United States significantly upgraded the export status of the United Arab Emirates, allowing the Emirati government and approved companies, including G42 and Core42, to receive advanced computing products without individual export licences. The decision reflects the growing strategic partnership between Washington and Abu Dhabi. It nevertheless carries two significant risks. The first is that sensitive American technology could eventually reach China, given the UAE’s extensive economic links with Beijing and G42’s previous dealings with Chinese companies. The second concerns the perception that strategic decisions may have become entangled with private business relationships involving Emirati entities and members of the Trump and Witkoff families. Washington should neither deny its Gulf partners access to advanced technology nor grant such access without robust safeguards. Preferential treatment should be conditional upon verifiable disengagement from high-risk Chinese suppliers, continuous end-use monitoring, transparent corporate ownership, and clear institutional separation between American foreign-policy decisions and the private financial interests of political officeholders. The New Currency of Power The confrontation between the world’s greatest powers is currently being played out on many fronts. Technological rivalry is doubtless one of the most important areas in this respect. Achievements and advances in technology enable more effective action in other fields and have become the ultimate symbol of civilisational superiority. Technological power is also a tool for influencing competitors in the political, economic, intelligence, and military spheres. One of the most intriguing developments today is the race to secure access to the latest technologies for the production of advanced semiconductors—and to determine who will dictate the universal rules of the game in this market. Here, as in many other areas, the two main rivals are the United States and the People’s Republic of China. American companies, led by Nvidia, are designing chips whose sophistication remains beyond the reach of most competitors. These are not only products of the highest quality, but also essential components in an era of rapid development in artificial intelligence and its growing impact on our daily lives. State-of-the-art semiconductors have become indispensable drivers of economic development. They also underpin advanced weapons systems, intelligence capabilities, data processing, and scientific research. It is therefore no wonder that their design and manufacture have become key elements in the long-term strategies of the leading global powers. Advanced semiconductors are subject to the highest levels of protection. They are considered too valuable to be allowed to enter the global market without safeguards from state institutions, operating solely under free-market rules and limited government control. Consequently, the most advanced chips are also a focus of intense interest from intelligence services and are particularly vulnerable to industrial espionage and illicit diversion. From Biden’s Tiered System to Trump’s Bilateral Approach In the final days of the previous Democratic administration, President Joe Biden approved the AI Diffusion Rule, which was intended to regulate individual countries’ access to the most advanced American chips and artificial-intelligence models. The framework divided countries into three broad categories, with different levels of access. The first comprised the United States and eighteen of its closest technological and security partners: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom. The vast majority of the world’s countries, including Poland and the Gulf states, were placed in an intermediate category subject to country-specific limits and licensing requirements. A final category consisted of arms-embargoed or otherwise high-risk destinations, including China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. No Middle Eastern monarchy was included in the first category, which caused consternation from Riyadh to Abu Dhabi. It appeared that even close ties with Washington, regardless of the political affiliation of the occupant of the White House, were insufficient to secure admission to this exclusive club. Donald Trump soon returned to the presidency and changed the strategy. In May 2025, his administration rescinded the AI Diffusion Rule before its principal compliance provisions came into force. The administration maintained strict controls on exports to China and other adversaries but rejected the previous system of categorising most of the world through a uniform regulatory framework. It concluded that bilateral arrangements would be more effective and more beneficial to American companies. This shift transformed advanced chips into an instrument of diplomacy. Access could now be negotiated as part of broader packages involving investment, defence cooperation, energy, infrastructure, and political alignment. The Gulf’s Technological Ambitions In this context, the wealthy Gulf states are playing an increasingly important role. They are seeking to diversify models of economic and social development that were based for many decades primarily on the extraction and export of crude oil and natural gas. Changing climate policies, long-term pressure to reduce dependence on fossil-fuel revenues, and persistent geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East—including the 2026 conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran—are encouraging the region’s monarchies to seek new paths towards economic development. One such path is the creation of technological hubs that can serve as new pillars of domestic industry and as expressions of the ambitions of rulers in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. The Gulf states have therefore sought access to the latest American products through lobbying, investment, and support for selected American initiatives on the international stage. Their objective is not merely commercial. They also seek to gain the trust of President Trump and his closest associates and to allay American concerns regarding the possible transfer of sensitive technologies to China. The most striking example is that of the United Arab Emirates. The UAE was one of the original Arab signatories to the Abraham Accords in 2020. Expanding the Accords and deepening cooperation between Israel and the Arab world have consistently been priorities for Trump’s Middle East policy. The UAE has frequently been cited as Israel’s model partner in this respect. Security cooperation between Israel and the UAE reached a new level during the 2026 war with Iran. Israel reportedly deployed an Iron Dome battery, its interceptors, and several dozen military personnel to the Emirates. The head of Mossad also reportedly visited the UAE to coordinate aspects of the campaign. These developments demonstrated that the Abraham Accords had evolved beyond diplomatic normalisation and commercial ties into practical strategic cooperation. Washington’s Strategic Reward On 10 July 2026, the Trump administration significantly eased restrictions on the transfer of advanced American technologies to the UAE. The Department of Commerce removed the Emirates from two restrictive country groups under the Export Administration Regulations and reclassified it as a Country Group A:5 destination. This made the Emirati government and approved companies eligible for licence-free access to certain controlled military technologies, commercial satellites, spacecraft, and dual-use products used in sectors including oil and gas, desalination, and civilian nuclear power. More importantly, the Emirati government and designated companies—including G42 and Core42—were authorised to receive advanced computing products in the UAE without individual licences. These products include artificial-intelligence chips and servers. The decision built upon earlier authorisations for the acquisition of Nvidia’s advanced Blackwell processors. The Department of Commerce presented the measure as recognition of the UAE’s status as a major American defence partner, its contribution to American national-security interests, and its commitments to preventing the diversion and misuse of sensitive technologies. The decision was a significant geopolitical victory for Abu Dhabi. It also illustrated how access to artificial-intelligence infrastructure has become a reward for strategic cooperation. However, the move has sparked considerable controversy for two reasons: one related to political and commercial ethics, and the other to geopolitical security. The World Liberty Financial Controversy The Emirati conglomerate G42 stands to be one of the principal beneficiaries of the relaxation of American regulations. The company is chaired by Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE’s national security adviser and brother of President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Concerns have arisen because of the overlap between Sheikh Tahnoon’s strategic responsibilities, his influence over G42, and investments by Emirati-backed entities in businesses connected to President Trump’s family. Four days before Trump’s second inauguration in January 2025, an Emirati investment vehicle associated with Sheikh Tahnoon reportedly agreed to purchase a 49 per cent stake in World Liberty Financial for $500 million. World Liberty Financial is a cryptocurrency company co-founded by members of the Trump and Witkoff families. According to subsequent reporting, an initial payment of $250 million was divided among entities connected to those families. This transaction must be distinguished from G42’s corporate activities: the investment was not made by G42 itself. Nevertheless, the fact that Sheikh Tahnoon chairs G42 and was associated with the World Liberty transaction has generated allegations of a conflict of interest. Even before the reported 49 per cent acquisition became public, an August 2025 analysis by The New Yorker estimated that the Trump family’s gains from the Emirati-linked World Liberty transactions then publicly known could amount to approximately $243 million. Democratic members of Congress have demanded investigations and have alleged that expanded Emirati access to advanced chips may have constituted a reward for these investments. A Senate resolution introduced in February 2026 called for the reversal of the chip-export decision and explicitly linked it to the World Liberty transaction. The White House and World Liberty Financial have denied that the investment had any connection to American policy towards the UAE. No evidence has yet established that the export decision was made in exchange for a private financial benefit. Even so, the appearance of a possible conflict is politically damaging and risks weakening confidence in the integrity of American export-control policy. The China Problem The second controversy concerns G42’s previous dealings with Chinese entities, including Huawei. In April 2024, Microsoft announced a $1.5 billion investment in G42 as part of an arrangement intended to bring the Emirati company more firmly into the American technological sphere. G42 undertook to divest from Chinese investments and reduce its dependence on Chinese equipment and suppliers. Nevertheless, American lawmakers and government agencies continued to express concern about G42’s historical links with companies associated with China’s surveillance, telecommunications, and military-industrial sectors. Microsoft subsequently introduced additional safeguards and limited the direct transfer of sensitive hardware and intellectual property. These concerns have not disappeared. According to recent reporting, officials at the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security circulated internal assessments warning that expanding G42’s access to cutting-edge American processors and artificial-intelligence models could increase the risk that sensitive technology would eventually reach American adversaries. Particular attention was paid to China’s enduring economic and technological influence in the Emirates. The problem is genuine. The Gulf states seek the best available American technology, but they have no desire to sever their extensive commercial relationships with China. Beijing remains a major customer for Gulf energy, an important investor, and a supplier of telecommunications infrastructure and other strategic products. The United States therefore expects the UAE to make a geopolitical choice that Abu Dhabi would prefer to avoid. Washington’s Dilemma At an April 2024 hearing of the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, Mohammed Soliman, Director of the Strategic Technologies and Cyber Security Programme at the Middle East Institute, described the dilemma facing both Washington and the Gulf states. Extensive American export controls place Middle Eastern countries in the difficult position of seeking the hardware necessary to develop artificial intelligence while demonstrating that it will not reach Chinese hands. At the same time, if Washington prevents Gulf partners from acquiring critical technologies because of their links with China, it risks alienating them and encouraging even closer cooperation with Beijing. The decision to deepen cooperation between American and Emirati high-technology companies is therefore also a matter of political calculation. Washington fears that an excessively strict approach to semiconductor exports will strain the Gulf states’ trust in the United States. The Chinese have repeatedly demonstrated that they are highly adept at exploiting such tensions to their own advantage. Yet unrestricted access would present equally serious risks. Once technological infrastructure has been transferred abroad, controlling access to it becomes considerably more difficult. Technology leakage, cyber-espionage, recruitment of personnel, corporate acquisitions, and relationships with third-country suppliers can gradually erode even carefully designed safeguards. The choice should therefore not be between excluding the Gulf states and granting them unconditional access. The United States should pursue a policy of conditional technological integration. Preferential access to advanced chips should depend upon verifiable disengagement from high-risk Chinese suppliers, permanent end-use monitoring, rigorous cybersecurity requirements, and transparent disclosure of corporate ownership and investment structures. American-controlled or jointly supervised facilities should be used when the sensitivity of the technology requires them. Washington should also establish an independent review mechanism for major export decisions involving companies controlled by politically exposed foreign individuals or linked to the private business interests of senior American officeholders. Such scrutiny would protect both national security and the credibility of the partnership. The UAE can become an important technological partner of the United States and a regional centre for artificial intelligence. But the success of this strategy will depend on Washington’s ability to combine geopolitical flexibility with enforceable security conditions and institutional transparency. Advanced semiconductors are becoming one of the principal currencies of international power. They should be used to consolidate alliances—but not at the cost of the technological advantage and political credibility they are intended to protect.