The Meccah Agreement is the latest of a series of new defense commitments. Over the past twenty years, formal military alliances have been mushrooming, and existing have been expanding. The European Union included a mutual defense commitment in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. Between 2009 and 2020, Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia joined NATO. They were followed by Finland in 2023 and Sweden in 2024. Formal bilateral defense commitments were signed by France and Germany (2019), Greece (2021), and Poland (2025), as well as between the United Kingdom and Germany (2025). Russia and the Democratic Popular Republic of Korea resurrected an old Cold War bilateral alliance in 2024. On the other side of the planet, Australia concluded such mutual defense commitments with Papua-New-Guinea (2025) and Indonesia (2026). The Middle East has not been immune to this development. In 2015, Russia revived its 1980 friendship and cooperation treaty with Damascus, which formed the basis of its intervention in the country. In 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a “Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement”. A few weeks later, the United States formally committed itself to the defense of Qatar. For Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the Meccah Agreement it is the second formal defense agreement of recent years. For Turkey, it is the first ever outside NATO. Why the flurry of new defense commitments around the world? A key reason is the hardening of the international competition, and increased military interventions by the United States, Russia, as well as Iran and, since 2023, Israel. In this context, Washington, especially since the return of Donald Trump to power in 2025, is seen in many countries as an increasingly unreliable defense guarantor, leading regional partners to look for complements or alternatives. While the Meccah Agreement may have reminded some of the 1955 “Baghdad Pact” and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) it established, the parallel is not appropriate: only two of the five signatories of the treaty are parties to the Mecca Agreement. But most importantly, the Baghdad Pact did not include any formal defense agreement. The Meccah Agreement does, since its mutual defense clause has been described by Turkey as being “technically the same” as NATO’s Article 5. In the current fluid geostrategic environment, any formal, mutual defense agreement signed between three middle Muslim powers should be taken seriously – especially as it was symbolically signed in the Holy City of Meccah. This is particularly the case for Israel given the increasing Turkish involvement in the region (including in Syria) and the tough Pakistani rhetoric about Israeli actions since 2023. However, a closer examination suggests that the mutual defense commitment included in the Agreement is, at this point, an extremely weak one. To begin with, the text itself has not (yet?) been published and commentary can rely solely on the short solemn declaration produced by the signatories. One reason could be that there the text includes caveats that limit its scope. However, nothing at this point suggests that a common military response would be envisioned in case a threat materialized – in contrast to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which includes a promise of assistance in case of an armed attack, “including the use of armed force”. This also suggests that the nuclear dimension – Pakistan being a nuclear-armed country – is unlikely to be part of the arrangement. A nuclear protection or “extended nuclear deterrent” is only valid if it is clearly signaled to potential adversaries. Nothing indicates that it has been the case. To be sure, granting such a nuclear protection would have given a fantastic argument to those within the Islamic Republic of Iran who believes that it is time to accelerate the program and cross the nuclear threshold. There are two other major differences with NATO. One is that the Meccah Agreement is concluded by a trio of regional powers, whereas the success of NATO has relied largely on the dominant role played by a powerful guarantor, the United States. Another, perhaps the most important one, is that the Atlantic Alliance was forged against a common adversary (the Soviet Union), recognized as such by all members, and its rejuvenation in recent years is based on the perception of an increasingly aggressive Russia. Nothing of the sort exists for Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which all have different “main adversaries”. Saudi Arabia does not seek to make Israel an enemy. Neither Ankara nor Riyadh would be interested in getting embroiled in a conflict in South Asia, the main focus of Pakistan’s defense. In addition, there are well-known strategic divergences between Saudi Arabia and Turkey on Syria, and most importantly on Ankara’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and affiliated groups. At first glance, it may seem that the Meccah Agreement is bound to suffer the same fate as previous regional defense agreements. Both the 1950 Arab League’s Joint Defense and Economic Co-operation Treaty and the 2000 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Joint Defense Agreement, which are still into force, include mutual defense clauses, but those have never been activated. This is probably excessive. Even if it does not translate into an instrument for joint military response to aggression, the Agreement is a powerful signal to all States in the region and most importantly to the United States, an ally of the three (including formally for Turkey) which is seen as increasingly unreliable. It has thus been correctly described as “hedging and signaling”. This is particularly important for Saudi Arabia, who has long sought a formal defense commitment from Washington but has so far not gotten one, who is constantly targeted by Iran, and is the weakest military power of the three. There is also the potential for increased defense industrial cooperation between the three, notably given the successful development of the Turkish military industry, which may become an alternative source of equipment for Saudi Arabia. In particular, Riyadhplans to participate in the Turkish KAAN fighter aircraft program. The agreement symbolizes some limitations of the Abraham Accords. It is surely excessive to describe it as “another nail in the coffin of Washington’s effort to build a regional security architecture that centers on Israel’s integration into the region” or to suggest that the Middle East could become a region divided in “two blocs: the countries that remained committed to the Abraham Accords and its alternative, the MeccahAgreement”. Neither of the two groupings is a “bloc”, and they are not mutually exclusive. One could argue that it could even make Saudi Arabia’s joining the Abraham Accords one day easier, Riyadh having diversified its security portfolio. But the Agreement does confirm that the Accords is not the only game in the Middle East town. Finally, growing defense cooperation between the three countries could pave the way for geo-economic cooperation. As they are not included into the India-Middle East Corridor project, Pakistan and Turkey could be interested in shaping alternative transport routes with Saudi Arabia, something Ankara and Riyadh began discussing in the Spring of 2026. Still, it would also be excessive to see the Meccah trio as being on the verge of forming a true alternative to the IMEC group. At this point in time, Riyadh remains committed to the project as envisioned in 2023. It also maintains excellent relations with Greece – an identified terminus of IMEC – to the point that Athens deployed Patriot batteries to help for the defense of the Kingdom. The Meccah Agreement is a symbolic and strategic victory for Riyadh, which has managed to complement its longstanding military relation with Islamabad by a new one with Ankara. But the exact scope and future of the agreement remains in doubt. They will depend on five signposts: Will the agreement formally ratified through the authorization of Turkish and Pakistani parliaments? If so, its text would have to be made public. Will the pact be enlarged and welcome new members? Egypt would be a powerful addition, but Cairo has so far adopted a wait-and-see attitude and is “taking its time”. The inclusion of Qatar would also be a very strong signal: it would create a “mini-axis” with Turkey inside the Agreement and suggest that Riyadh’s hatred of the Muslim Brotherhood is left aside to the benefit of regional cooperation. Will a formal organization be created, including a common military command? A first step in this direction was taken on August 31 when the “Strategic and Political Defense Committee” met for the first time in Istanbul. At this occasion, it was announced that a General Secretariat would be based in Saudi Arabia. Will Turkey deploy troops and equipment on Saudi soil, like Pakistan has done several times in the past, and more recently in May 2026 when it sent a fighter squadron and thousands of troops to protect the Kingdom. Most importantly, will the agreement’s “Article 5” ever be activated? A first test was the attacks against Saudi Arabia by Houthi rebels in August, as the ink on the Meccah Agreement was barely dry. This did not result in any immediate reaction by Ankara or Islamabad. A true test would come if or when the Islamic Republic of Iran resumes major operations against Saudi soi A separate question is whether potential adversaries of the signatories – such as Israel, Iran, or India – see it as having any deterrent value. The question is largely unanswerable: it is difficult to measure the efficacity of a deterrent except in the very long run (for instance, when two adversaries refrain from using force against one another after the deterrent is established). But one can measure its possible failure – that would be the case in case of a major attack against one of the three signatories. As for the Israeli government, it has so far refrained from any strong public reaction to the Meccah Agreement, adopting so far a cautious attitude regarding an accord that does not represent any military threat or major strategic problem for the Jewish State. At this point in time, it is the right approach.